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PLEASANT GROVE CITY v. 
SUMMUM: IDENTIFYING 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH & 
CLASSIFYING SPEECH FORUMS 
AARON HARMON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 17, 2007, a Tenth Circuit panel granted a preliminary 
injunction requiring Pleasant Grove City (“Pleasant Grove”) to erect 
and display in a municipal park a monument containing the “Seven 
Aphorisms” of a religious organization known as Summum.1 
Summum had previously offered to donate the monument hoping it 
would be displayed in the park owned by Pleasant Grove alongside a 
Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles (“Eagles”).2 Summum claimed that Pleasant Grove violated its 
rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment3 by 
accepting and displaying the Ten Commandments monument but 
rejecting the Seven Aphorisms monument.4  
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Summum and granted the 
injunction based on two findings. First, following circuit precedent, the 
court treated the Ten Commandments monument as the private 
speech of the Eagles and not the government speech of Pleasant 
Grove.5 Second, the court found that a municipal park was a public 
forum if it permanently displays privately-donated monuments.6 On 
 
 * 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (Pleasant Grove I), 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
 2. Id. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 4. Pleasant Grove I, 483 F.3d at 1047. 
 5. Id. at 1047 n.2 (citing Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1006 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(holding an identical Ten Commandments monument was the private speech of the Eagles)). 
 6. Id. at 1050. 
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August 24, 2007, the Tenth Circuit denied Pleasant Grove’s petition 
for rehearing en banc by a 6-6 vote.7 On March 31, 2008, the United 
States Supreme Court granted Pleasant Grove’s certiorari petition.8 
II.  FACTS 
Pleasant Grove City, Utah, maintains a history-themed park—
Pioneer Park.9 The city owns and displays in the park many privately-
donated monuments, including the Ten Commandments monument 
donated by the Eagles.10 Pleasant Grove claims that all privately-
donated monuments in the park meet historical-relevance criteria in 
that the monuments (1) portray the pioneer heritage of Pleasant 
Grove or (2) were donated by a person or group with long-standing 
ties to Pleasant Grove.11 
In 2004, Pleasant Grove adopted a written policy for monument 
selection at Pioneer Park to codify existing practices.12 Under the 
policy, the city council may exclude any proposed monument either 
for failure to meet the historical-relevance criteria13 or for aesthetic or 
safety reasons.14 The council also decides where any accepted 
monument is placed.15 
Summum is a religious organization based in Salt Lake City.16 In 
September 2003, before Pleasant Grove adopted its written policy for 
monument selection, Summum asked the city to accept and display a 
monument containing its “Seven Aphorisms” in Pioneer Park.17 The 
monument was to be similar in size and appearance to the Ten 
Commandments monument.18 Pleasant Grove declined Summum’s 
proposal because the monument failed the historical-relevance 
 
 7. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (Pleasant Grove II), 499 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 8. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (Pleasant Grove I), 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), 
cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008) (No. 07-665). 
 9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 (Nov. 
20, 2007). 
 10. Id. at 5. 
 11. Pleasant Grove I, 483 F.3d at 1052 n.5. 
 12. Id. at 1055 n.9. 
 13. Id. at 1047. 
 14. Id. at 1054. 
 15. Pleasant Grove II, 499 F.3d at 1177 (McConnell, J., dissenting). 
 16. Pleasant Grove I, 438 F.3d at 1047. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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criteria.19 In May 2005, Summum again asked the city to erect its 
Seven Aphorisms monument but was ignored.20 In response, Summum 
filed suit in federal district court seeking, among other things, 
injunctive relief requiring Pleasant Grove to accept and place the 
monument in the park.21 Summum claimed it was entitled to such 
relief because Pleasant Grove’s actions amounted to unconstitutional 
speech discrimination pursuant to the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause.22 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Tenth Circuit’s two principal findings in the Pleasant Grove 
case derive from two prior Tenth Circuit cases involving Summum. In 
Summum v. City of Ogden23 and in Summum v. Callaghan24 the court 
entertained similar challenges against a city and a county, respectively. 
The city and the county each displayed a Ten Commandments 
monument donated by the Eagles on government property but 
declined to display Summum’s Seven Aphorisms monument. 
A. Government Speech vs. Private Speech in the Tenth Circuit 
In Callaghan the Ten Commandments monument was located in 
front of a county courthouse;25 in Ogden it was located on the lawn of 
a municipal building.26 In both cases the court treated the monuments 
as the private speech of the Eagles rather than as government 
speech.27 This differentiation was important because Free Speech 
jurisprudence recognizes a fundamental distinction between 
government speech and private speech.28 Specifically, when the 
government speaks, no “forum” for private speech is created. Put 
another way, when the government speaks it may craft its own 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 24. Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 25. Id. at 909. 
 26. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 997. 
 27. Id. at 1004; Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 913–16; see also discussion infra Part III.C. 
 28. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234–35 
(2000) (“The Court has not held, or suggested, that when the government speaks the [forum 
analysis] rules [for private speech] we have discussed come into play.”). 
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message without worrying about speech discrimination.29 In contrast, 
when private speech is permitted on government property, a “forum” 
for speech is created and the government is required to follow certain 
policies and procedures that ensure speech discrimination does not 
occur.30 
In Callaghan the court simply treated the Ten Commandments 
monument in front of the county courthouse as the Eagles’s private 
speech without explanation,31 perhaps because the county did not 
assert that the monument was government speech. In Ogden, 
however, the city argued that it was not involved in unconstitutional 
speech discrimination because the monument was government speech 
and therefore created no forum for speech on the municipal lawn.32 
To determine whether the monument was government speech, the 
Ogden court utilized a four-factor test adopted by the Tenth Circuit in 
Wells v. City and County of Denver.33 Under this test, a court is likely 
to hold that government speech is at issue when some or all of the 
following factors are present: (1) the central purpose of the speech is 
to promote the views of the government; (2) the government 
exercises editorial control over the content of the speech; (3) the 
literal speaker is an employee of the government; or (4) the ultimate 
responsibility for the content of the speech rests with the 
government.34  
Applying this test, the court held that the monument was the 
Eagles’s private speech because only the fourth factor was met.35 The 
court reasoned that the city maintained ultimate responsibility for the 
monument’s content because the city owned the monument and was 
 
 29. See generally Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541–42 (2000) (the 
government has the “latitude” to restrict private speech when conveying its own message); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“When the 
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may 
take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted 
by the grantee.”) (emphasis added). 
 30. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983). 
 31. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 913–16. 
 32. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1003–04. 
 33. Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 
2000)). 
 34. Id. at 1141. 
 35. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1004–05. 
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free to sell, modify, or even destroy it at will.36 As to the first three 
factors, the court found as follows: First, the central purpose of the 
monument was to promote the views of the Eagles, not the views of 
the city.37 This was evident because the Eagles donated monuments to 
numerous cities with the professed intent of providing a moral code 
for youth to emulate.38 Second, the city did not exercise editorial 
control over the monument’s content because it accepted the 
monument in completed form.39 Third, the city was not the literal 
speaker because it had not altered the monument’s content in any 
way after the monument was donated.40 
B. Government Speech vs. Private Speech in Other Circuits 
Many circuits do not utilize the Wells test to determine if 
privately-donated displays constitute government speech. Rather, 
these circuits hold that the government speaks when it owns or selects 
the display that is exhibited on government property.  
For example, in PETA v. Gittens, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
selection of private sculpture designs for display in a public park 
constituted government speech.41 Specifically, the court held that the 
government spoke when it determined which sculptures to include in 
the display.42 Similarly, in ACLU v. Schundler the Third Circuit held 
that a Christmas crèche display in front of the city hall was 
government speech because the crèche was owned by the city and 
displayed on city property.43 And in Serra v. United States General 
Services Administration, the Second Circuit held that the government 
spoke when it made the decision to remove a donated sculpture from 
a government plaza.44 Lastly, in Freedom from Religion Foundation v. 
Marshfield, the Seventh Circuit treated an expressive display as the 
private speech of a landowner who purchased the land and the 
display from the government.45 
 
 36. Id. at 1005. 
 37. Id. at 1004. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1004–05. 
 41. PETA v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 28–29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 42. Id. 
 43. ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1444 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 44. Serra v. U.S. Gen. Serv. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 45. Freedom from Religion Found. v. Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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C. Forum Analysis Applied to Private Speech 
Forum analysis is used to identify unconstitutional speech 
discrimination and applies only to private speech.46 It does not apply 
to government speech.47 Thus, in Callaghan and Ogden, after finding 
the Ten Commandments monuments were private speech, the Tenth 
Circuit engaged in forum analysis. 
The first step of forum analysis is to determine if the speech is 
constitutionally protected.48 Most speech is protected, whether 
religious or secular.49 If protected, the second step is to identify the 
relevant forum where the speech is to occur.50 This is a two-step 
process that requires identifying (1) the government property the 
speaker seeks to access and (2) the type of access the speaker seeks.51 
The third step is to determine the relevant forum’s classification. 
There are three possible forum classifications: (1) traditional public 
forums; (2) designated public forums; and (3) nonpublic forums.52 
Traditional public forums are government properties that by tradition 
are used for public communication (e.g., parks or streets).53 
Designated public forums are nonpublic government properties that 
the government has opened to public communication by designation 
(i.e., the government formally authorizes public communication on 
nonpublic government property).54 Nonpublic forums are government 
properties that are not open to public communication either by 
tradition or by designation.55 
The classification of the forum determines the standard of review 
the court will apply to speech restrictions in that forum.56 Speech 
restrictions in traditional public forums and designated public forums 
will trigger strict scrutiny if they are content-based (i.e., the 
 
 46. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44–46 (1983). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). 
 49. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (noting that only certain 
narrow and well-defined classes of speech such as “fighting words” are not protected by the 
First Amendment). 
 50. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800–02. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
 53. Id. at 45. 
 54. Id. at 46. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). 
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restrictions discriminate on the basis of subject matter, viewpoint, or 
identity of the speaker).57 Content-based speech restrictions must 
serve a compelling state interest and be the narrowest method of 
achieving that interest to survive strict scrutiny.58 Content-neutral 
restrictions, which control the time, place, or manner of speech in a 
public forum, will receive intermediate scrutiny.59 In nonpublic forums, 
speech restrictions will be subject to reasonable basis scrutiny.60 To 
survive reasonable basis scrutiny61 the restrictions must comport with 
a government policy that is both reasonable and viewpoint neutral.62 
Applying the first step of forum analysis as outlined above, the 
Tenth Circuit in Callaghan and Ogden concluded that Summum’s 
monuments constituted protected speech.63 The Tenth Circuit then 
applied the second forum analysis step in both cases. In Callaghan, it 
determined that the relevant forum was the courthouse lawn.64 
Although the Callaghan court did not explain how it came to this 
determination, it appears to have applied only the first of the two 
steps required when identifying the relevant forum (i.e., it identified 
the government property to which Summum sought access but did not 
define the type of access sought).65 The Ogden court made a more 
detailed finding regarding the relevant forum. First, it observed that 
the government property to which Summum sought access was the 
municipal building’s lawn.66 Then it observed the type of access sought 
was the right to place a permanent monument on the lawn.67 Thus, the 
Ogden court concluded that the relevant forum was the permanent 
monuments on the municipal building’s lawn, rather than the lawn 
generally.68 
 
 57. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Cornelius v NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).  
 61. “Reasonable basis” is synonymous with “rational basis.” Id. at 821 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 806 (majority opinion). 
 63. Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 913–14 (10th Cir. 1997); Summum v. City of 
Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 64. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 913–14. 
 65. See id. at 913–19 (applying forum analysis to the courthouse lawn without discussing 
the specific type of access sought). 
 66. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1002. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/30/2008  4:54:43 PM 
64 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:57 
 
In the final step of the forum analysis, the Tenth Circuit in both 
cases classified the relevant forum as nonpublic.69 The bases for these 
classifications were that neither tradition nor designation evidenced 
that a courthouse lawn or a gallery of permanent monuments on a 
municipal lawn was a forum for public communication.70 
Finally, both courts applied reasonable basis scrutiny and 
concluded that the rejection of Summum’s monument was not a 
reasonable and viewpoint neutral policy and was therefore 
unconstitutional speech discrimination.71 In Callaghan, the court 
focused on the county’s total lack of a policy to guide county officials 
in selecting appropriate monuments for display on the courthouse 
lawn.72 The court held that the unfettered discretion of county officials 
“raise[d] the specter of . . . viewpoint censorship” and was 
presumptively unreasonable.73 The Ogden court also focused on a lack 
of city policy regarding monument selection.74 Significantly, the Ogden 
court added that a government can demonstrate a reasonable and 
viewpoint neutral policy by showing either (1) a written policy or (2) a 
well-established practice that directs official decisions regarding the 
selection and display of private monuments.75 The city of Ogden failed 
to make either showing because it had no written policy and because 
the displays on the municipal lawn did not conform to the criteria of 
the purported unwritten policy the city claimed to follow.76 
IV.  HOLDING 
Following the analysis in Summum v. Callaghan and Summum v. 
City of Ogden, the Tenth Circuit held in Summum v. Pleasant Grove 
City that the Ten Commandments monument in Pioneer Park was the 
private speech of the Eagles.77 Pleasant Grove argued that its 
rejection of Summum’s monument was not speech discrimination 
because the Ten Commandments monument was government speech, 
 
 69. Id.; Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 919. 
 70. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1002; Callaghan 130 F.3d at 915–16. 
 71. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1011; Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 921–22. 
 72. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 919. 
 73. Id. (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988)). 
 74. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1007–09. 
 75. Id. at 1007. 
 76. Id at 1007–09. 
 77. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (Pleasant Grove I), 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.2 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
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but was unsuccessful. Absent en banc reconsideration, the court was 
bound to follow precedent and treat the Ten Commandments 
monument as private speech.78 
Continuing to follow Ogden and Callaghan, the court next held 
Summum’s monument to be protected speech.79 It then proceeded 
with forum analysis. Following Ogden’s precedent, the court observed 
that the government property to which Summum sought access was 
the city park and the type of access sought was the display of a 
permanent monument there.80 It thus identified the relevant speech 
forum as the permanent monuments in the park.81 
The court then classified the monument gallery as a traditional 
public forum.82 In reaching this conclusion the court focused solely on 
the nature of a city park as a prototypical public forum.83 It held that 
the type of access sought was germane to identifying the relevant 
forum but not to determining the classification of that forum.84 Thus, 
because the monuments were located in a traditional public forum 
(the park) they were themselves deemed a traditional public forum.85 
The court next noted that though Pleasant Grove did have 
“substantial interests” in maintaining the aesthetic appearance of its 
parks,86 the restrictions on the display of monuments were not merely 
aesthetic: they were content based.87 Thus, Pleasant Grove could ban 
all permanent displays by private individuals, which would survive 
intermediate scrutiny,88 but it could not exclude displays on the basis 
of subject matter (the item must portray pioneer history) or identity 
of the speaker (the speaker must have long-standing ties to Pleasant 
Grove), which are subject to strict scrutiny.89 
 
 78. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9–10, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 
(Nov. 20, 2007). 
 79. See Pleasant Grove I, 483 F.3d at 1047 n.2. 
 80. Id. at 1050. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1051. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. (explaining that the type of access sought is relevant to identifying the relevant 
forum but that the nature of the forum is determined by the nature of the property on which it is 
located). 
 86. Id. at 1053. 
 87. Id. at 1052. 
 88. Id. at 1054. 
 89. Id at 1052. 
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Finally, the court cited what it felt was a special line of cases in 
which the Supreme Court has not applied forum analysis to content-
based speech restrictions in public forums.90 The court interpreted 
these cases as requiring a government to be free from forum analysis 
when it is acting in the particular role of librarian, television 
broadcaster, or arts patron.91 According to the court, the Supreme 
Court’s rationale was that government cannot be effective when 
acting in these particular roles unless it has unfettered discretion to 
make content-based decisions about what private speech to provide 
to the public.92 The court felt the Supreme Court’s reasoning was 
limited to these three specific roles and that Pleasant Grove’s role in 
maintaining a history-themed park was not analogous.93 
V.  ANALYSIS 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City is 
problematic for a number of reasons, foremost of which is its 
characterization of the Ten Commandments monument as private 
speech. As outlined above, Pleasant Grove owns the monument, has 
sole authority to approve its display in the park and designate its 
placement, and may remove, modify, sell, or destroy it at any time.  
The city has allowed the monument to remain in the park some 
twenty-seven years because it comports with the park’s historical-
relevance criteria.94 As described previously, the majority of circuits 
hold that privately-donated displays owned by the government and 
selected for display by the government are government speech. In a 
similar vein, the Supreme Court itself has held that “compilation of 
the speech of third parties . . . [is a] communicative act[].”95  
Also, one may doubt the correctness of the conclusion in 
Summum v. City of Ogden that the Ten Commandments monument 
was private speech. The Ogden court held that the Ten 
 
 90. Id. at 1052 n.4 (citing United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003); 
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998); Nat’l Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Reply to Brief in Opposition at 3, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 (Mar. 7, 
2008). 
 95. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). 
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Commandments monument only satisfied the fourth prong of the 
Tenth Circuit’s four-factor test for government speech.96 But the Ten 
Commandments monument at issue in Pleasant Grove probably 
satisfies the second prong (requiring “editorial control” over the 
speech) as well because Pleasant Grove had the power to alter the 
content of the monument before it was placed in the park and simply 
chose not to.97 All of these considerations militate toward treating the 
Ten Commandments monument as government speech. 
Another troubling aspect of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling was the 
treatment of the gallery of monuments in the park as a traditional 
public forum. This classification was based entirely on the fact that 
parks are traditionally used for civic discourse.98 However, this 
discourse typically takes the form of temporary speech or assembly 
(such as distributing leaflets or holding a rally),99 not erecting 
permanent monuments.100 Furthermore, basing the forum classification 
solely on the nature of the property to which Summum sought access 
(the park) made identifying the type of access sought (placing a 
permanent monument in the park) pointless. The classification 
analysis would have been no different had the court simply identified 
the relevant forum as the park rather than monuments in the park. 
The Pleasant Grove holding that permanent monuments in a city 
park are traditional public forums creates a difficult legal hurdle for 
displays in city parks. Any city that declines to display privately-
donated monuments in a park where others have been allowed will 
probably be subjected to strict scrutiny.101 Like Pleasant Grove, most 
cities will not be able to demonstrate a compelling state interest in 
maintaining historic, or other, themes associated with their parks.102 
Thus, they will face the unfortunate predicament of either accepting 
all privately-donated monuments for display in their parks or, as the 
Pleasant Grove court suggested, adopting the content-neutral policy 
 
 96. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004–05 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 97. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City (Pleasant Grove II), 499 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (10th Cir. 
2007) (McConnell, J., dissenting). 
 98. Pleasant Grove I, 483 F.3d at 1051. 
 99. Pleasant Grove II, 499 F.3d at 1173 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Pleasant Grove I, 483 F.3d at 1053 (explaining that cities bear the burden of showing 
their content-based speech restrictions are based on compelling interests and narrowly tailored). 
 102. Id. 
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of banning all private displays in order to survive intermediate 
scrutiny.103  
If the court had instead ruled that the gallery of park monuments 
was a nonpublic forum, such a holding would have allowed Pleasant 
Grove (and other cities) to maintain their themed parks by 
demonstrating that placement decisions are based on a reasonable 
and viewpoint neutral written policy or well-established practice.104 
Although Summum’s request predated Pleasant Grove’s adoption of 
a written policy, the city may nevertheless have been able to show a 
well-established practice of allowing only those privately-donated 
monuments that met its historical-relevance criteria to be displayed in 
the park. As evidence of this practice, the city could have shown that 
all monuments currently in the park conform to the historical-
relevance criteria Pleasant Grove claims to follow.105 
One final troubling point is that it is unclear whether there is a 
special line of Supreme Court cases that requires the government to 
be free from forum analysis when playing the role of television 
broadcaster, librarian, or arts patron. The three cases cited by the 
Tenth Circuit in support of this proposition do not explicitly state that 
the roles of television broadcaster, librarian, or arts patron are exempt 
from forum analysis. Rather, each case simply appears to explain why 
government conduct in these roles is not subject to strict scrutiny.106 
That said, even if the Tenth Circuit’s reading of these cases was 
correct, the court gave no explanation as to why the logic of these 
cases would not extend to Pleasant Grove.107 After all, doesn’t 
selecting items for a history-themed park involve content-based 
decisions similar to selecting items for an art-themed park? 
 
 103. Id. at 1054. 
 104. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1008 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 
(Nov. 20, 2007) (describing in detail the monuments currently located in the park). 
 106. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (holding public 
library internet access is a nonpublic forum not subject to strict scrutiny); Ark. Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (declaring the selection of programming to be a 
form of government speech not subject to speech discrimination claims); Nat’l Endowment for 
the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (holding that the government may make grants to 
artists based on the merit of their art even though direct regulation of this sort would not 
survive strict scrutiny). 
 107. See Pleasant Grove I, 483 F.3d at 1052 n.4. 
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VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of Pleasant Grove’s Case 
The strengths of Pleasant Grove’s case have largely been outlined 
above. First, most circuits would defensibly treat the Ten 
Commandments monument as government speech. Second, the 
gallery of permanent monuments in a public park is probably a 
nonpublic forum. Third, there is not a strong distinction between a 
government acting as a procurer of historical monuments on the one 
hand and as a patron of the arts or public broadcaster on the other. 
Finally, the ruling below will probably place Tenth Circuit cities in the 
unenviable position of either accepting all privately-donated 
monuments for display in their parks or banning all private displays. 
The principal weakness of Pleasant Grove’s case is that Summum 
may be able to successfully argue that the decision below was a 
narrow one that only implicates situations in which the government 
does not expressly adopt the speech of privately-donated 
monuments.108 Language in Summum v. City of Ogden suggests that 
the government may “adopt” private speech as its own and thereby 
transform it into government speech.109 However, this alternative was 
not mentioned in the Summum v. Pleasant Grove City decision so its 
vitality as a legal rule is questionable. 
B. Strengths and Weakness of Summum’s Case 
The weaknesses of Summum’s case mirror the strengths of 
Pleasant Grove’s case outlined above. The principle strength of 
Summum’s case is that it has found its way to the Supreme Court in a 
preliminary posture. The procedural matter litigated on appeal and 
for which review was granted was the appropriateness of a 
preliminary injunction.110 It is possible that if the case were to be fully 
litigated it would be resolved in a way that does not require 
addressing the constitutional questions for which certiorari was 
granted. For example, it would be unnecessary to determine whether 
permanent park monuments are a public forum if it were shown that 
 
 108. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum, No. 07-665 (Feb. 21, 2008). 
 109. Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1003–04. 
 110. Pleasant Grove I, 483 F.3d at 1048. 
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Pleasant Grove engaged in viewpoint discrimination because such 
discrimination is unconstitutional in both public and nonpublic 
forums.111 
C. Likely Disposition 
It is likely the Supreme Court will hold that Pleasant Grove’s Ten 
Commandments monument is government speech and therefore did 
not create a forum for private speech. Although the Supreme Court 
has not developed its own specific test for identifying government 
speech, the test employed by many lower courts treats privately-
donated displays as government speech when they are both owned 
and selected for display by the government. Under this test, Pleasant 
Grove’s Ten Commandments monument qualifies as government 
speech. Also, the Tenth Circuit’s own test for government speech 
suggests that Pleasant Grove maintained the requisite control and 
authority over the monument’s content to treat it as government 
speech.  As a result, Pleasant Grove will have legal sanction to decline 
to display Summum’s Seven Aphorisms monument. 
 
 
 111. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 108, at 
21. 
